In a recent editorial reprinted in The Business Insider (Here’s Why The Yuan Will Never Be The World’s Reserve Currency),
China expert Michael Pettis argued forcefully against the notion that
the Chinese Yuan will be ever be a global reserve currency on par with
the US Dollar. By his own admission, Pettis seeks to counter the claim
that China’s rise is inevitable.
The core of Pettis’s argument is that it is arithmetically unlikely –
if not impossible – that the Chinese Yuan will become a reserve
currency in the next few decades. He explains that in order for this to
happen, China would have to either run a large and continuous current
account deficit, or foreign capital inflows into China would have to be
matched by Chinese capital outflows.” Why is this the case? Simply, a
reserve currency must necessarily offer (foreign) institutions ample
opportunity to accumulate it.
However, as Pettis points out, the structure of China’s economy is such
that foreigners don’t have such an opportunity. Basically, China has run
a current account/trade surplus, which has grown continuously over the
last decade. During that time, its Central Bank has accumulated more
than $2.5 Trillion in foreign exchange reserves in order to prevent the
RMB from appreciating. Foreign Direct Investment, on the other hand,
averages 2% of GDP and is declining, not to mention that “a significant
share of those inflows may actually be mainland money round-tripped to
take advantage of capital and tax regulations.”
For this to change, foreigners would need to have both a reason and
the opportunity to hold RMB assets. The reason would come from a
reversal in China’s balance of trade, and the use of RMB to pay for the
excess of imports over exports, which would naturally imply a
willingness of foreign entities to accept RMB. The opportunity would
come in the form of deeper capital markets, a complete liberalization of
the exchange rate regime (full-convertibility of the RMB), and the
elimination of laws which dictate how foreigners can invest/lend in
China. This would likewise an imply a Chinese government desire for
greater foreign ownership.
How likely is this to happen? According to Pettis, not very.
China’s financial/economic policy are designed both to favor the export
sector and to promote access to cheap capital. In practice, this means
that interest rates must remain low, and that there is little impetus
behind the expansion of domestic consumption. Given that this has been
the case for almost 30 years now, this could prove almost impossible to
change. For the sake of comparison, consider that despite two “lost
decades,” Japan nonetheless continues to promote its export sector and
maintains interest rates near 0%.
Even if the Chinese economy continues to expand and re-balances
itself in the process (a dubious possibility), Pettis estimates that it
would still need to increase the rate of foreign capital inflows to
almost 10% of GDP. If economic growth slows to a more sustainable level
and/or it continues to run a sizable trade surplus, this figure would
rise to perhaps 20%. In this case, Pettis concedes, “we are also
positing…a radical change in the nature of ownership and governance in
China, as well as a radical redrawing of the role of the central and
local governments in the local economy.”
So there you have it. The political/economic/financial structure of
China is such that it would be arithmetically very difficult to increase
foreign accumulation of RMB assets to the extent that the RMB would be a
contender for THE global reserve currency. For this to change, China
would have to embrace the kind of reforms that go way beyond allowing
the RMB to fluctuate, and strike at the very core of the CCP’s
stranglehold on power in China.
If that’s what it will take for the RMB to become a fully
international currency, well, then it’s probably too early to be having
this conversation. Perhaps that’s why the Asian Development Bank, in a recent paper,
argued in favor of modest RMB growth: “sharing from about 3% to 12% of
international reserves by 2035.” This is certainly a far cry from the
“10 years” declared by Russia’s finance minister and tacitly supported by Chinese economic policymakers.
The implications for the US Dollar are clear. While it’s possible
that a handful of emerging currencies (Brazilian Real, Indian Rupee,
Russian Ruble, etc.) will join the ranks of the international
currencies, none will have enough force to significantly disrupt the
status quo. When you also take into account the economic stagnation in
Japan and the UK, as well as the political/fiscal problems in the EU,
it’s more clear than ever that the Dollar’s share of global reserves in
one (or two or three) decades will probably be only slightly diminished
from its current share.
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