In a recent piece published in the WSJ (“Why the Dollar’s Reign Is Near an End“),
Berkley Professor Barry Eichengreen declared that the Dollar will soon
cease to be the world’s reserve currency. According to Dr.
Eichengreen, within 10 years and for various reasons, the Dollar will
become one of many reserve currencies, competing for preference with
the Euro, Chinese Yuan, Japanese Yen, and Swiss Franc. While
Dr.
Eichengreen makes some good points, however, I don’t think most of his
arguments stand up to scrutiny.
His thesis can be boiled down into a few premises. First of all, he
argues that it is fundamentally illogical that oil should be priced in
Dollars, and that countries conducting bilateral trade should settle
their accounts using Dollars. Dr. Eichengreen is right that this
represents the main underpinning of the Dollar. He is wrong to suggest
that it will change anytime soon.
That’s because oil ultimately has to be priced in currency. It’s
entirely possible that oil exporting countries will band together and
decide to price oil in Euros, instead. However, this would mainly be
useful as a political tool (albeit a very potent one!) and would serve
no economic or risk management purpose whatsoever. If oil were priced
in terms of a basket of currencies (such as IMF Special Drawing
Rights), it might make oil prices less volatile, but then would require
oil exporters to receive 5 (or more!) currencies for their oil instead
of one! Finally, the price of oil can and does adjust relative to what
happens in forex markets. When the Dollar declined in 2007, oil prices
skyrocketed commensurately in order to compensate exporters.
The same largely applies to bilateral trade. While it makes sense
for two countries with stable currencies (such as Korea and Japan, for
example) to use one of their currencies as the main unit for trade, the
same cannot be said for countries with more volatile currencies. For
example, if Argentina and Israel are trading, one country would be
inherently dissatisfied if trade were denominated either in Shekels of
Pesos. When bills are settled in Dollars, however, it is easy and
economical for both countries to simply convert those Dollars into
currencies which may have more utility for them. As with oil, it’s
possible that some countries will decide that it makes more sense to
settle trade in Euros instead of Dollars, but again, I don’t see what
purpose this would serve and any such decision would probably be
politically motivated.
Second, Dr. Eichengreen points out that changes in technology have
made it easy to instantly calculate exchange rates and easily convert
currency. While I think this point is well-taken, I think people enjoy
having a common base currency, if only for psychological reasons.
Ultimately, this point is irrelevant because it has very little bearing
on the supply and demand for particular currencies.
Third, he argues that the Euro and Chinese Yuan both represent
latent threats to the Dollar’s preeminence. Again, he’s both right and
wrong. The Euro already represents a viable alternative to the Dollar.
It’s economy is reasonably strong, its monetary policy is sensible, its
capital markets are deep and liquid. On the other hand, it’s being
held back by perennial fears about the a Euro breakup, and the fact
that the sum of 20 separate parts is not the same as the whole. Since
the EU doesn’t issue sovereign debt, risk-averse investors will be
limited to buying German/French/etc. bonds, which are always going to
be more less liquid and more risky than US Treasury Securities.
Besides, you can see from the chart below that the US economy has
actually been growing faster than the Eurozone for the last 30 years.
As for China, I expounded in a recent post
about how unlikely it is that the Yuan will seriously rival the Dollar
anytime soon. While China certainly has plenty of cachet and expanding
vehicles for investment, its capital markets remain much too primitive
and opaque for Central Banks and risk-averse investors. Most
importantly, the structure of China’s economy is such that foreign
institutions simply don’t have the opportunity to accumulate Yuan in
massive quantities. Simply, the supply is too small. In fact, the Asian
Development Bank forecasts that the Yuan will constitute a mere 3-12%
of international reserves by 2035. That doesn’t sound very threatening.
Dr. Eichengreen’s final point is that the Dollar’s safe haven status
has been compromised. First of all, this is old news. The Yen is
already a – if not the – preeminent safe haven currency, thus headlines
like “Safe-Haven Yen Gains As Radiation Concern Mounts” that take
irony to a whole new level. The same goes for the Swiss Franc. However,
any concerns that investors have about the Dollar must necessarily
also be projected onto the Yen, Euro, and Pound. All of these
currencies face current or looming fiscal crises and slowing economic
growth. While investors might diversify into other countries, they’re
not going to suddenly dump the Dollar in favor of the Euro.
In short, it makes sense that a currency that represents 80% (out of a
total of 200%) of all forex transactions and more than 60% of global
reserves but only accounts for 25% of GDP, should experience a decline
of some sort of decline in popularity. Over the next 50 years, the
Dollar will gradually cede share to other currencies. But 10 Years? Give
me a break.
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